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SUMMARY 
 
One challenge in evolutionary economics is to give greater operational content to the notion 
of "innovating routines" inside the firm.  Historical and contemporary evidence suggests that 
such routines always have to deal with increasing specialisation in knowledge production, 
increasing depth in knowledge sources and complexity in physical artefacts, and with the 
continuous matching of specific corporate competencies and organisational practices to the 
market opportunities offered by specific technologies.  As a consequence, some innovating 
routines have always been important, such as those dealing with the tasks of co-ordination 
and integration within the firm, and of reducing uncertainty through learning.  Others are 
becoming more so, such as those co-ordinating technological resources external to the firm, 
coping with systems and simulations, and adapting organisational practices to the 
requirements of radically changing technological opportunities. 
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1. WHY THE NOTION OF ROUTINES NEEDS MORE EMPIRICAL CONTENT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to give greater empirical content to the notion, first elaborated 
by Nelson and Winter in 1982, of "innovating routines".  They defined routines in general as 
the regular and predictable behavioural patterns within firms who are coping with a world of 
complexity and continuous change that precludes decisions and behaviour that maximise 
anything of importance.  Whilst acknowledging the considerable uncertainties surrounding 
innovation, Nelson and Winter agreed with Schumpeter that " ….organizations have well-
defined routines for the support and direction of their innovative efforts." (p. 134).   
 
Since then, considerable brainpower has been mobilised to dissect the notion of routines, 
and to compare it with other concepts like "skills", "operating procedures", "capabilities", 
"competencies", and "distinctive corporate advantage".  But we still have only a very hazy 
idea of what innovating routines are in practice.  How would practising managers respond 
when asked, "what are your innovating routines?”  At best, with polite incredulity.  How 
would observant scholars recognise an innovating routine, when (and if) they visit a business 
firm?  At best, by observation and good intuition.   
 
There are at least three sets of reasons why knowledge of innovating routines – especially in 
large firms – deserves greater attention.  The first is practical.  It could help identify 
ingredients for the successful management of innovation, and links with corporate strategy.  
As we shall see later, it could also improve understanding of the links between private 
corporate knowledge and public academic knowledge, help identify some of the major 
implications for the management of innovation of improvements in information and 
communications technologies (ICT), and provide insights into the effects of technology on 
industry dynamics and structures. 
 
The second reason is theoretical.  The notion of “routines” was first developed by Nelson 
and Winter (1982) as part of a more realistic interpretation of what managers actually do in a 
messy and changing world.  However, it can be argued that fewer insights of practical 
importance have been developed since then on the basis of the notion of routines, than on 
the basis of (say) transaction cost or principle-agent theories.  At the same time, other 
dimensions of evolutionary economics have had more influence: in particular, in strategic 
management and industrial dynamics, where new theoretical concepts have been 
successfully combined with rich bodies of empirical evidence. 
 
The third reason is that similar opportunities now exist in relation to innovating routines.  
Over the past twenty years, business historians, management specialists, sociologists, 
economists and other scholars have accumulated impressive bodies of evidence on what 
happens inside the innovating firm, and some have developed explanatory models for parts 
of the innovation process, including the capacity to distinguish success from failure1.  This 
has writer has had two opportunities recently to read and assimilate this evidence: first, 
together with Ed Steinmueller for a chapter in a handbook for doctoral students on corporate 
strategy (Pavitt and Steinmueller, 2001); second, together with John Bessant and Joe Tidd 
                                                           
1  One of the earliest was the distinction, made by Burns and Stalker (1961), between "mechanistic" and 
"organic" forms of organisation, with the latter better able to deal with changing and uncertain environments. 
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for textbook for masters students on managing innovation (Tidd et al., 2001)2.  This paper is 
a first attempt to synthesise this evidence. 
 
2. ASSUMPTIONS: ABOUT THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF KNOWLEDGE, AND ABOUT 
THE TASKS OF ROUTINES 
 
2.1 The three dimensions of knowledge production and use 
 
So far, this writer has been unable to find a simple or elegant theoretical framework to 
encompass the richness of the empirical material on corporate innovative activities3.  
However, in organising this material, it has proved useful to divide the processes of 
innovation into three, partially overlapping, processes each of which is more closely 
associated with contributions from particular academic disciplines. 
• Producing scientific and technological knowledge: since the industrial revolution, the 
production of scientific and technological knowledge has been increasingly specialised, by 
discipline, by function and by institution.  Here, history and social studies of science and 
technology have been the major academic fields contributing to our understanding 
• Transforming knowledge into working artefacts: in spite of the explosive growth in 
scientific knowledge in this period, theory remains an insufficient guide to technological 
practice, given the growing complexity of technological artefacts, and of their links to 
various fields of knowledge.  Technological and business history has made major 
contributions here and, more recently, so have the cognitive sciences. 
• Matching working artefacts with users’ requirements: the nature and extent of the 
opportunities to transform technological knowledge into useful artefacts vary amongst fields 
and over time, and determine in part the nature of products, users and methods of 
production.  In the competitive capitalist system, corporate technological and organisational 
practices therefore co-evolve.  These processes are central concerns of scholars in 
management and economics. 
 
In sections 3 to 5 below, I shall identify in the light of these three processes, what are the 
essential managerial tasks that innovating routines must accomplish.  Given current fashions 
that everything is changing, I distinguish tasks that innovating firms have been carrying out 
for some time and still need to do so, from those that appear to be genuinely new. 
 
2.2 Tasks and Routines 
 
Whilst we shall see that essential managerial tasks emerge from the features of innovation 
processes described above, they can be achieved through a variety and a combination of 
routines, some of which may be formal and explicit, and others implicit and organisationally 
embedded.  Thus, to take the important task of ensuring integration amongst corporate 
functions (see 3.1 below), this may involve very formal routines imposed by management 
(e.g. planned flows of information and personnel amongst functions; matrix management; 
heavyweight project teams) to informal ones emerging from everyday practice (e.g. meetings 
                                                           
2 I have also benefited from earlier work with Stephano Brusoni and Andrea Prencipe (Brusoni et al., 2000), by 
P. Nightingale (Nightingale, 2000), and from reading Coombs and Metcalfe (2000). 
3  Given initial training, first, as a pilot, then as an engineer, I am uncomfortable with analyses that start with (for 
example) “Let’s begin by assuming that metal fatigue does not exist.”  Subsequent experience in policy-related 
social science has re-inforced this view. 
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in bars and sports clubs; bootlegging and misreporting; e-mails).  In other words, there are a 
variety of routines that can help accomplish a task essential for innovation.  This paper does 
not have the ambition to evaluate the relative effectiveness of specific routines in 
accomplishing a given task.  It restricts itself to identifying the tasks that routines must 
accomplish. 
 
3. INCREASING SPECIALISATION IN KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
 
3.1 What's the same: Internal Co-ordination, Increasingly Multitechnology 
Products & Diversification  
 
As Adam Smith rightly predicted, specialisation in the production of knowledge has turned 
out to be just as efficient as in the production of goods and services (Pavitt, 1997; Pavitt and 
Steinmueller, 2001).  Three interrelated dimensions of such specialisation can be 
distinguished: - between disciplines in universities, between functions in firms, and between 
institutions (e.g. firms and universities) in countries.  Specialisation requires co-ordination, 
but to differing degrees.  Empirical studies show that some processes of co-ordination can 
and should be consciously managed and reasonably tightly coupled: like the links within the 
firm between R & D and other functions, and between corporate professionals in various 
scientific and technical disciplines.  Others require a softer touch: like the establishment 
between universities and business of partly non-market based networks between like-minded 
researchers5.  These findings confirm the notion that the more costly and less uncertain 
processes of technological selection should be more tightly constrained than the less costly 
and more uncertain processes of search. 
Increasing specialisation in disciplines has also meant that an increasing range of fields of 
knowledge are being deployed in business firms to solve technical problems and to reach 
technical targets.  Products incorporate an increasing number of fields of knowledge, and so 
are the firms that make them: compare the exclusively mechanical weaving loom of the late 
18th century with today’s equivalent, which also incorporates electrical, electronic and even 
aerodynamic technologies.  One consequence is that technologies (e.g. computing) should 
not be confused with closely related artefacts (e.g. computers), since the former is used in 
many more products than the latter (e.g. computing in automobiles.  See also Granstrand et 
al., 1997).  Another consequence has been that new combinations of fields of knowledge6 
have enabled firms based in rich fields of science and technology – like chemistry, and 
electrical and electronic fields in the past, and ITC today - to diversify by creating and 
entering cognitively related product markets. 
 
Yet another consequence of specialisation has been the difficulties facing managers in large 
firms in decomposing their organisation, in order to match unique fields of technology with 
unique classes of product.  Increasingly multi-technology products in diversifying firms have 
made the pure M-form of organisation impossible to sustain.  Some of form of central 
corporate laboratory or technical competence persistently proves necessary in order to help 
mix and match changing technologies with changing products and divisions. 
                                                           
 
5 See, for example, Pisano, 1991. 
6 Although Schumpeter spoke extensively of "new combinations", he was not thinking specifically of knowledge 
(Tunzelmann, 1995, p. 76-78), to which Adam Smith gave more central important in the innovation process 
(Pavitt, 1997). 
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3.2 What's changing: External  Co-ordination - the  'Third  Face'  of   Corporate  
R & D 
 
An important and relatively recent manifestation of the increasing specialisation in 
knowledge production has been the growth of so-called "strategic alliances" between large 
firms, designed to exchange knowledge in rich technological fields like ICT and 
biotechnology.  One explanation for this growth has been that - as with production - firms 
have been "outsourcing" R & D in order to reduce technology-related costs, and to 
concentrate on their core technological competencies.  But the evidence shows the contrary: 
both corporate R & D costs and their dispersion across fields have continued to increase in 
large firms (Granstrand et al., 1997) 
 
A more plausible explanation is the continuously increasing number of technological fields 
that firms must monitor and master.  These have increased not only with the division of 
labour in the production of knowledge, but also with the division of labour in the production 
of goods and services.  The latter has led to increasing vertical disintegration (great 
"roundaboutness") in the production system.  Changes and improvements in the production 
system can be handled satisfactorily through purely market mechanisms, when the links 
between the various production stages can be made modular, namely, when they have a 
standardised physical interface between each stage, which allows improvements to be made 
autonomously within each stage.  Firms are then able to outsource current production of 
components and sub-systems, in order to benefit from cost advantages arising from 
competition, as well from changes and improvements still possible within established 
modular configurations.   
 
However, complete modularity is not sustainable, for two reasons (Brusoni et al, 2000).  
First, growing product complexity increases the probabilities of unforeseen systemic 
interactions amongst components and subsystems.  Second, rapid technical change and 
increases in performance in one part of a system can create both bottlenecks and 
opportunities in other parts.  Under such conditions, firms at the centre of complex or fast-
changing supply systems - be they physical supply systems as in the automobile industry, or 
knowledge supply systems as in pharmaceuticals - must also have the means to co-ordinate 
change in these systems, especially when they are designing and implementing major 
changes7. 
 
Empirical studies show that such firms maintain in-house a systems integration capability: 
first, in order to monitor and stimulate improvements by suppliers within the modular 
constraints of established systems; and second, in order to integrate major architectural 
changes periodically into new and improved systems.  With increasingly systemic 
complexity (of which more in section 4.2 below), it is likely that a growing share of 
corporate technological activities are being devoted to these activities.  In addition to 
innovation and imitation, corporate R & D now therefore has a third face (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1987): co-ordinating change and improvement in increasingly complex external 
product and knowledge networks – often called “systems integration”. 
 
3.3 What's Changing: "Useful" University Research - Opportunities not Incentives 
                                                           
7 For theoretical explorations of this phenomenon, see Franken et al., 1999; Marengo, 2000. 
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Another (perhaps related) recent change has been in the role of university-based research in 
underpinning corporate innovative activities.  Here it is particularly important to distinguish 
rhetoric from reality. Much current rhetoric - mainly from government sources - is that 
university research has in the past been too "blue sky" and "academic", and should now be 
focussed more closely towards application.  The current reality - based on statistical studies 
and surveys - shows that the research appreciated most by corporate practitioners is publicly 
funded, undertaken in high prestige research universities, and published in high quality 
academic journals (Mansfield, 1995; Narin et al., 1997).  It also shows that the training of 
high quality researchers is generally more appreciated by practitioners than direct inputs of 
knowledge to corporate practice (Martin and Salter, 2001). 
However, there is scattered evidence that university research is beginning to make more 
direct inputs into corporate technological activities, but not because of government-led 
policies and exhortations to be more "useful".  For example, a recent study shows that 
licensing income from research in major US universities has increased dramatically in the 
past 20 or more years (Mowery et al., 2001).  The rise began before the Bayh-Dole Act in 
biotechnology, suggesting that the increase has been opportunity-rather then incentive-
driven.  There have also been related increases in university-based spin-off firms, not only in 
biotechnology, but also in fields benefiting from improvements in large-scale data 
processing like speech recognition and computational chemistry (Mahdi and Pavitt, 1997; 
Koumpis and Pavitt, 2000). 
 
One possible explanation for this apparently greater involvement is that, whilst large firms 
previously explored the opportunities emerging fast-moving fields from their central 
laboratories in direct contact with university departments, they are now doing so increasingly 
through "loose-coupled" arrangements to explore potential fields of application through 
university spin-offs firms.  This may be linked to another change, namely the increase in the 
range of technological opportunities emerging from university-based research in certain 
fields, because applied experiments have become much cheaper, following improvements in 
fundamental understanding, in measurement, and in computation and simulation (see section 
4.3 below).  Given the high uncertainties involved, companies prefer to stimulate 
developments through loosely coupled arrangements rather than close integration (Pisano, 
1991). 
 
4. INCREASING COMPLEXITY IN ARTEFACTS 
 
4.1 What's the Same: Coping with Uncertainty – Rules vs. Judgement 
 
Schumpeter was right about the growing predictability of corporate inputs into innovative 
activities, but wrong about outputs.  Specialised R & D and related activities have certainly 
become institutionalised and predictable source of discoveries, inventions, innovations and 
improvements.  But technologists and managers are still not able to make accurate 
predictions about the emergence and acceptability of major new products, about the 
technical performance of newly designed artefacts, about the costs or time to develop them, 
or about the size of market for specific innovations.  This is because the world of innovation 
is complex, in that it involves many variables, the properties and interactions of which are 
understood only very imperfectly.  As a consequence, we are not able to explain fully and 
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predict accurately either the technical performance of major innovations, or their 
acceptability to potential users (or even who the potential users are). 
 
Corporate management therefore continues to have difficulties in deciding how to deal with 
innovative activities, which have some of the elements of conventional investments 
activities, but which are also uncertain and therefore require continuous feed back from 
experience and experiment to learning.  The broad differences between search and selection 
activities has been recognised for a long time in practice with the distinction between 
corporate and divisional R & D activities, and in theory with the distinction between 
"knowledge building" and "strategic positioning" on the one hand, and "business investment 
" on the other (Mitchell and Hamilton, 1988). 
 
However, as the recent history of corporate R & D shows, maintaining balance and linkages 
between the two is not an easy task.  Briefly stated, there is no one best way of evaluating 
corporating R & D expenditures ex ante.  Rule-based systems fail because they inevitably 
simplify, and may therfore neglect what turn out to be important factors in a complex 
system.  Judgement based systems fail because of the impossibility of quickly distinguishing 
good judgement from good luck.  As a consequence, there are periodic swings in fashions 
and management practices, with attempts - often following "failures" or examples of "waste" 
- to "manage" R & D more effectively through "better" techniques forecasting, more 
"rigorous" methods of personnel management, and of project selection and control.  These 
are often subverted by practice and by evidence of missed opportunities.  Professional 
judgement and experience then displaces management technique as the main basis for 
decisions, and the co-ordination of learning across organisational and professional 
boundaries becomes paramount.  This style of innovation management is likely to be more 
successful, but more difficult to achieve, since it depends on the person-embodied skills and 
informal networks, rather than on codified techniques and procedures.  So failure can start 
off the whole cycle again. 
 
4.2 What's the same: Increasing Scientific Understanding & Increasing Technical 
Complexity 
 
One interesting paradox in the development of new technology is that, despite the massive 
increase in scientific understanding in the past 200 years, technological practice stills runs 
ahead of what scientific theory can predict.  Most expenditure in business firms is still on the 
development and testing of specific artefacts rather than on the development of underlying 
theory.  The sheer combinatorial complexity of useful artefacts precludes accurate 
predictions of practice based purely on theory (Girin, 2000).  This is why technology 
advances through the practices of scientists and engineers that Constant (2000) has recently 
described as recursive, involving "alternate phases of selection and of corroboration by use. 
…… The result is strongly corroborated foundational knowledge: knowledge that is 
implicated in an immense number and variety of designs embodied in an even larger 
population of devices, artefacts, and practices, that is used recursively to produce new 
knowledge." (p. 221). 
 
However, there are grounds for thinking that technical complexity cannot run too far ahead 
of scientific understanding.  The feedback loops in both directions between improvements in 
scientific understanding and improvements in technical performance have been well 
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documented by historians and others8.  More specifically, increases in technical complexity 
and associated increases in combinatorial complexity will by themselves increase the risks 
and costs of search and selection.  One factor that can reduce them is improved scientific 
understanding of cause-effect relations, very often emerging from advances in the 
technologies of measurement and manipulation of the increasingly small.  This has been the 
case in the past decades in molecular biology and materials, both of which have opened 
major new opportunities for technical change9. 
 
4.3 What's changing: ICT in improving understanding and increasing complexity 
 
A second factor reducing the costs of search and selection has emerged from ICT.  Major 
advances in large-scale computing and simulation technology are reducing considerably the 
costs of exploring alternative technical configurations.  Nightingale (2000) has shown that 
experimental techniques in the pharmaceutical industry have in the past ten years seen major 
changes resulting from all the mechanisms described above: first a shift towards more 
fundamental science, for example, linking biochemical mechanisms to the expression of 
genes; second, using simulations and data banks to conduct virtual experiments 
complementary to real ones; third, using high throughput screening techniques.  His findings 
tend to corroborate the recent suggestion by Perkins (2000) that improved search strategies 
involve both "code" (i.e. theories) and "construction" (i.e. prototypes)10.   
 
However, Perkins’ (and others') use of "Fitness Landscapes" does not grapple with most of 
the central features of corporate activities for technological search and selection that can be 
found today in sectors as different as aircraft and pharmaceuticals: namely, the design, 
testing and re-design of hierarchical and interdependent systems, subsystems and 
components, based on bodies of increasingly specialised knowledge and practice, that are 
continuously improving, and at different speeds. 
 
Finally, whilst reducing the costs of search, advances in ICT are also increasing 
opportunities for greater systemic complexity..  Advances in network and digital 
technologies are opening major new possibilities of products and services with much greater 
systemic interdependence , involving not just the spheres of production and exchange, but 
also those of distribution (e.g. logistics, sales and deliveries in retailing) and of domestic 
consumption (TV, computing, messaging and photography). 
 
5. THE CO-EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANISATION 
 
5.1 What’s the same: Matching Specific Technologies and Specific Organisational 
Practices  
 
                                                           
8  See, for example, Rosenberg and Nelson (1994) on the origins of the engineering disciplines in US 
universities. 
9  A similar conclusion has been reached by Becker and Murphy (1992).  They argue that the degree of 
specialisation in tasks is limited not by the extent of the market, but by the costs of co-ordinating specialised 
activities.  These co-ordination costs are reduced by increases in general knowledge. 
10  Without any such theoretical codes, and without any cheap method of constructing and testing prototypes, the 
costs of search and selection can become prohibitively high.  See Martin on why Japanese swords did not 
improve over a period of more than 5000 years. 
10 
It is a commonplace today to argue that technologies and organisational practices co-evolve.  
It is less common to expose oneself to accusations of "technological determinism" by 
arguing that, on the whole, corporate organisational practices adapt, in order to exploit 
emerging technological opportunities.  On historical grounds, Chandler (1977) has shown 
that the rise in the USA at the end of the nineteenth century of the large, multi-unit firm, and 
of the co-ordinating function of professional middle managers, depended critically on the 
development of the railroads, coal, the telegraph and continuous flow production.  Similarly, 
the later development of the multi-divisional firm in part reflected the major opportunities 
for product diversification in the chemical industry opened up by breakthroughs in synthetic 
organic chemistry.   
 
Technical advances normally precede organisational advances, because of their firmer 
knowledge base and the lower costs of experimentation.  This does not mean that technology 
imposes one organisational "best way": variety in the characteristics of technologies, their 
continuous change and uncertain applications lead to variety and experimentation in 
organisational practices.  But it also does not mean that "anything goes" in organisation.  For 
example, a firm practising conventional cost-benefit analysis and strict cost controls with all 
its investment decisions will not prosper in the long term in a competitive market governed 
by the exploitation of a rich, varied and rapidly advancing body of technological 
knowledge11. 
 
Based on the empirical literature, the first two columns in Table 1 identify the key features 
of technologies that must be matched with corporate organisational practices.  The richness 
of the technological opportunities and the scale of technical experiments will determine the 
appropriate share of resources allocated to technological search, as well as the degree of 
centralisation and fluidity in organisation structures.  Supporting skills and networks will 
define the specific competencies to be accumulated, professional networks to be joined and 
key functions and functional interfaces within and across which learning must take place 
within the firm.  And the strategic position of the firm will determine which the technologies 
are supported as part of its distinctive core advantage, or as necessary background 
technologies. 
                                                           
11 See, for example, the history of the UK General Electric Company under Arnold Weinstock (Aris, 1998) 
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TABLE 1 MATCHING CORPORATE TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANISATIONAL PRACTICES 
 
 
 
CORPORATE TECHNOLOGY      
Î 
MATCHING ORGANISATION 
PRACTICESÎ 
DANGERS IN RADICAL 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
INHERENT CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Richness of opportunities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Costs of specific technical 
experiments 
 
1a. Allocating resources for 
exploring options 
 
 
1b Matching technologies with 
product divisions 
 
2.  Degree of centralisation in 
decision-making 
 
1a. Greater opportunities not 
matched by resources for 
exploring options 
 
1b. Matching opportunities 
missed 
 
2.  Reduced cost of experiments 
not matched by decentralisation 
SUPPORTING SKILLS AND 
NETWORKS 
1. Specific sources of external 
knowledge 
 
 
2. Accumulated knowledge of 
specific customers' demands, 
distribution channels, production 
methods, supply chains. 
 
 
1. Participation in specific 
professional knowledge networks. 
 
2.  Learning and improving in key 
functions and across key 
functional interfaces. 
 
 
1. Difficulties in recognising 
& joining new knowledge 
networks 
 
2a. Difficulties in recognising 
& responding to new customers' 
demands, distribution channels,  
production methods, supply 
chains. 
 
2b. Difficulties in recognising 
new key functional interfaces 
 
3. Scepticism and resistance 
from established or potentially 
obsolescent professional and 
functional groups 
STRATEGIC POSITION IN THE FIRM 
1. Core technologies (Central to 
sustained competitive advantage.  
Difficult to imitate) 
OR 
2.  Background technologies 
(Necessary for use of outside 
technologies in supply chain and 
pervasive applications) 
 
 
1. Strong commitment of 
technical resources to maintain 
state of the art 
OR 
2. Commitment of technical 
resources sufficient to monitor 
and assimilate technologies 
developed outside the firm 
Inability to distinguish core 
from background: 
1. Excessive outsourcing of 
core technologies; 
 
OR 
2. Inability to sustain 
competitiveness with 
background technologies 
 
Differences amongst technologies are therefore reflected in differences in organisation 
practices.  Thus, given rich technological opportunities, both pharmaceutical and consumer 
electronics firms devote substantial resources to technological search; but given the much 
higher costs of experimentation, the former tends to have centralised and formal procedures 
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for launching new products, whilst the latter is more likely to be decentralised and informal.  
Similarly, both pharmaceutical and automobile companies have centralised decision 
structures, but the former will stress interfaces between corporate R & D and public research 
in bio-medical fields, whilst the latter will stress links between R & D and production. 
 
5.2 What's the Same: Widespread Adoption of Revolutionary Technologies 
 
The past 200 years has seen periodic step-jumps in technological understanding and 
performance in specific fields, based increasingly often on major scientific breakthroughs.  
These have reduced considerably the costs of key economic inputs, and have therefore been 
widely adopted and become the catalysts for major structural changes in the economy.  They 
include steam power, electricity, motorization, synthetic materials and radio 
communications (Freeman and Louca, 2000).  The contemporary example is of course the 
massive and continuing reductions in the costs storing, manipulating and transmitting 
information brought about by improvements in ICT.  
 
Each wave of radically new technologies has been associated with the emergence of firms 
that have mastered the new technologies, and that have led in the development and 
commercialisation of related products, processes and services.  In the current jargon of 
corporate strategy, these firms have developed core competencies in the new technologies, 
which have become a distinctive and sustainable competitive advantage.  They must be 
distinguished from the far more numerous firms who adopt and integrate the new 
technologies with their current activities.   For these firms, in-house competencies in the new 
technologies are background: in other words, necessary for the effective adoption of 
advances made outside the firm.   
 
Paradoxically, the very fact that new technologies allow step-jump reductions in the costs of 
a key input simultaneously makes their adoption both a competitive imperative, and an 
unlikely source for the adopting firms of their own distinctive and sustainable competitive 
advantage.  For example, in the past many factories had no choice but to adopt coal and 
steam - and later electricity - as a source of power, given their cost and other advantages.  
The same is true today for many ICT-based management practices.  In neither case were - or 
are - these revolutionary advances by themselves a source of sustainable competitive 
advantage for the adopting firms.  This means that much of the emphasis by writers on 
corporate strategy - like Barney (1991) and Porter (1996) - on the importance of establishing 
a distinctive and sustainable advantage does not, and cannot, apply to the major 
transformations now inevitably happening in many companies through the adoption of ICT.  
Their framework helps understand CISCO (a major US supplier of equipment for the 
Internet), but doesn't help much with TESCO (a major UK supermarket chain, increasingly 
using the Internet). 
 
5.3 What's changing: Creative Destruction in Organisational (not Technological) 
Practices 
 
Ever since Schumpeter associated the advent of revolutionary technologies with "waves of 
creative destruction", there has been debate about the relative role of incumbent large firms 
and new entrants in exploiting them.  Over the past 20 years, most of the analytical writing 
has been stacked against incumbents, although recent empirical studies can point to evidence 
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in favour of both (Methe et al., 1996).  Over time, the weight of the arguments against has 
shifted.  Earlier studies emphasised the difficulties facing incumbents in mastering new 
fields of technological knowledge (Cooper and Schendel, 1976; Tushman and Anderson, 
1986; Utterback, 1993).  More recently, there has been a shift towards emphasising the 
difficulties in changing and matching established organisational practices to the 
opportunities opened by revolutionary technological changes: examples include the 
organisational consequences of changes in product architectures (Henderson and Clark, 
1990), resistances from groups with established competencies (Leonard-Barton, 1995; 
Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), and of the unexpected emergence of new markets (Christensen, 
1997; Levinthal, 1998). 
 
Contrary to a widely made assumption, the nature and directions of radical new 
technological opportunities are easily recognised by the technically qualified: for example, 
miniaturisation, compression and digitalisation today in ICT.  The technological 
consequences of these trends can be explored in corporate R & D laboratories: thus, a 
growing number of large firms in a growing number of industries are now technically active 
in ICT (Granstrand et al., 1997; Mendonca, 2000).  However, the difficult, costly and 
uncertain task is that of combining radically new technical competencies with existing 
technical competencies and organisational practices, many of which may be threatened or 
need to be changed.  Experimentation and diversity is therefore necessary, not in exploring 
the directions of radical technological changes, but their implications for products, markets 
and organisational practices. 
 
The third column of Table 1 tries to identify some of the reasons why such experiments may 
fail in incumbent firms. Some are a consequence of the need to modify competencies or 
organisational practices, and some of the inevitable uncertainties in the early stages of 
radically new technologies. The likelihood that established firms will fail increases with the 
number of practices and competencies that need to be changed.  Here a comparison between 
the conclusions of two recent industry studies is instructive.  Klepper and Simons (2000) 
have shown that firms already established in making radios were subsequently the most 
successful in the newly developing colour TV market.  On the other hand, Holbrook and his 
colleagues (2000) have shown that none of the firms established in designing and making 
thermionic valves were subsequently successful in establishing themselves in 
semiconductors. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that success in semiconductors 
required more changes in both technological competencies and organisational practices 
amongst incumbents than success in colour TV.  The valve firms required the new 
competencies and networks in quantum physics, a much stronger interface between product 
design and very demanding manufacturing technology, and the ability to deal with new sorts 
of customers (computer makers and the military, in addition to consumer electronics firms).  
For the radio firms, the shift to colour TV required basically the same technological 
competencies, augmented by well-known screen-technologies.  Otherwise, the customers 
and distribution channels remained unchanged, as did the key networks and linkages both 
inside and outside the firm. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Achievements so far 
 
This paper has argued that innovating routines in business have to deal with three 
fundamental features of technical change in modern societies: increasing specialisation in 
knowledge production, the tendency for technological practice to run ahead (but not too far 
ahead) of scientific theory, and the continuous matching of the specific features of changing 
technologies and specific organisational practice that transform technology into useful 
artefacts.   
 
It emerges from our analysis that some of the tasks of innovating routines are long 
established, and continue to be important: for example, co-ordination and integration of 
internal knowledge sources and functions; technology-based product diversification; coping 
imperfectly with uncertainty; learning by analysing and by doing.  Other tasks are growing in 
importance as a consequence of increasing specialisation in knowledge production: co-
ordination and integration of external as well as internal knowledge sources; anticipating the 
dangers of creative destruction in corporate organisational - rather than technological - 
practices.  And yet others are changing - at least in part - because of the effects of rapid 
improvements in performance in ICT: increasing technical complexity; reduced costs of 
technical experiments; more direct links in university research to practice. 
 
The paper has (hopefully) one achievement.  It has made at least some progress in its 
initially stated purpose to give more operational content to the notion of innovating routines.  
Based on the corporate tasks identified above, it should be possible for academics to ask 
questions about how they are accomplished in business firms, to get meaningful answers, 
and thereby identify innovating routines.  It also opens a rich research agenda on the efficacy 
of various routines – and combinations thereof – in accomplishing the corporate tasks in 
specified circumstances. 
 
6.2 Next Steps: Checklists, models or recipes? 
 
However, the paper has two very obvious limitations.  The first is theoretical.  Although it 
proposes the three fundamental features of innovation process repeated above in the opening 
paragraph of the Conclusions, it offers no testable model of the innovation process. This is 
because, in this author’s view, a comprehensive and testable model dealing with all the 
important factors identified above cannot yet be built12.  In such circumstances, it is probably 
better to keep things simple, and start from a checklist of important tasks and related 
routines.  Thereafter, it will possible usefully to model and predict delineated parts of the 
innovation process, provided boundary conditions are carefully and realistically defined.  For 
example, one would justifiably be sceptical about the explanatory power of a model of a 
supplier-user alliance, established to develop new and radically improved product 
components, if it assumed that the alliance was a zero-sum game. 
                                                           
12  In a recently published book about technological change, contributing scholars from a variety of disciplines 
concluded that    "   its categories and their interactions are too imprecise and contextual to be represented 
realistically by a computable algorithm.   …….  A mathematical simulation can never be true to life.    It …is a 
metaphor in its representation of a real system with complex unquantifiable structural relationships between its 
elements" (Ziman, ed., 2000, p.312). 
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The second, more practical, limitation is that the paper offers no obvious simple recipe for 
managerial action to promote successful innovation.  Here we can be more categoric: there is 
none.  As we have seen, well established tasks often still matter, new ones emerge, and their 
precise nature varies between technologies, and changes often unpredictably over time.  
Given these conditions, we can at best offer a checklist of important innovation-related tasks 
on the basis of which corporate practitioners can use their judgement and experience.  This 
presumably is what they are paid to do. 
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